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ABSTRACT 
Many Chicagoans are getting shortchanged, particularly when it comes to the 
money-exchange process between the Illinois Lottery (IL) and the Illinois State Board of 
Education (ISBE). In Illinois, a significant portion of lottery-generated revenues is 
earmarked to finance public education. Because these revenues are not generated equally 
across Chicago, some communities contribute more to education via the lottery than 
others. When these revenues are distributed in such a way that transfers money from one 
community to another, one community’s fiscal gain comes at another’s expense. So the 
question stands: Who plays and who pays? To answer this question, I measure the 
economic incidence of the money-exchange process between the IL and ISBE. My focus, 
however, is limited to the city of Chicago as a case study. In other words, I 
simultaneously compare the generation of lottery revenues to the appropriations of these 
funds, all within the city limits of Chicago. My hypothesis, or wager if you will, predicts 
that the money-exchange process, between the IL and ISBE, transfers resources from 
marginalized to mainstream communities, and that this process is inherently racialized. I 
estimate that lottery-generated revenues disproportionately come from communities that 
are predominately comprised by people of color, specifically blacks and Latina/os. These 
funds are then redistributed in such a way that racially marginalized communities 
subsidize education, a public service to which everyone is entitled.
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE LOTTERY: A MECHANISM FOR REPRODUCING RACIAL INEQUALITY 
Many Chicagoans are getting shortchanged, particularly when it comes to the 
money-exchange process between the Illinois Lottery (IL) and Illinois State Board of 
Education (ISBE). In Illinois, a significant portion of lottery-generated revenues is 
earmarked to finance public education. Because these revenues are not generated equally 
across Chicago, some communities contribute more to education via the lottery than 
others. When these revenues are distributed in such a way that transfers money from one 
community to another, one community’s fiscal gain comes at another’s expense. So the 
question stands: Who plays and who pays? 
To answer this question, I measure the economic incidence of the money-
exchange process between the IL and ISBE. My focus, however, is limited to the city of 
Chicago as a case study. In other words, I simultaneously compare the generation of 
lottery revenues to the appropriations of these funds, all within the city limits of Chicago. 
My hypothesis, or wager if you will, predicts that the money-exchange process, between 
the IL and ISBE, transfers resources from marginalized to mainstream communities, and 
that this process is inherently racialized. I estimate that lottery-generated revenues 
disproportionately come from communities that are predominately comprised by people 
of color, specifically blacks and Hispanics, and then these funds are redistributed and 
spread across other communities throughout the city. 
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At face value, the interactive relationship between the IL and ISBE may seem 
race-neutral and colorblind. After all, no one group is required to play the lottery more 
than another, and the legal provisions governing the IL and ISBE are not racially explicit. 
This, however, does not negate the potential for these institutions’ interactive relationship 
to be deeply racialized. This is particularly true when money is taken from communities 
of color then redistributed across other communities, especially predominately white 
ones. If my wager is correct, then the means by which Illinois funds public education is 
neither equitable nor progressive. Instead, this money-exchange process represents an 
inherently racialized state policy that can exacerbate racial inequalities by reproducing 
white privilege and nonwhite burden, particularly for blacks and Hispanics. 
Now that my hypothesis has been proposed, let me outline the organization of my 
argument that follows. This thesis is organized in four parts: a brief literature review, my 
methodological approach, an analysis of racialized economic incidence, and a concluding 
statement about state-sponsored racism. In the first section, I discuss the widespread 
popularity of state lotteries, their general purpose, and the nature of their operation. Much 
of my focus, given the purpose of my investigation, is centered on the state of Illinois. 
The second section previews what methodological steps I take to complete the study. I 
detail my research design ranging from how data was collected and analyzed. In the next 
section, I simultaneously analyze the generation and appropriation of lottery revenues. 
For the last section, I situate my argument within the larger literary context of racism and 
highlight how the state constitutes a mechanism for reproducing inequality via the lottery.
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CHAPTER TWO 
HIGH STAKES PUBLIC FINANCING:  
SITUATING THE ILLINOIS LOTTERY IN A NEO-LIBERAL CONTEXT 
Neo-liberalism fosters an environment in which lotteries thrive. It has spurred 
both the economic and social disinvestment of the welfare state, in which support for 
public services such as healthcare, housing, and education has been withdrawn. While 
neo-liberal ideology rationalizes why the welfare state should wither, neo-liberal 
economic theory has restructured modes of production across not only the U.S. but the 
globe. Considering these combined factors, it becomes easier to understand why many 
Americans resent taxes for public services and how many of these same people lack 
ample means to pay for these services. Such a situation has left governments, particularly 
those at the state level, in positions where they must look to alternative sources of capital 
to finance the public sector. For many state governments, lotteries present an opportunity 
to generate large sums of money to fill budgetary shortfalls. Millions of dollars can be 
raised with little resistance, as no mandatory taxes are imposed upon the people. After all, 
lotteries are among Americans’ favorite form of gambling.  
Social Aspects of Neo-Liberalism 
When former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said, “There is no such 
thing as society” (see Kealy 1987:9) these words became a mantra for neo-liberal 
thought. Though it is common to speak of neo-liberalism strictly in market terms, 
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Thatcher’s words demonstrate that it cannot be narrowly defined as such. Neo-liberalism 
is as much a social and cultural phenomenon as it is an economic one. Brown (2003) 
aptly captures this point when she points out that catchphrases such as “free trade,” 
“maximized competition,” “de-regulation,” “privatization,” and the “invisible hand” can 
be extended and disseminated “to all institutions and social actions” (p. 7).  
If society does not exist, the world is comprised of nothing more than individual. 
This is a logical conclusion of neo-liberal principles applied to social thought, and this 
conclusion has strong political implications. When opportunities and circumstances are 
not socially derived, individuals become responsible for their own position in life. Social 
forces such as history, power, and inequality are divorced from constraining and enabling 
individual choices. Not only are they divorced, but they are erased from existence. 
Inequitable distributions of power, resources, and opportunity cannot be a plausible 
explanation for group disparities, because the failure to provide of one’s own needs 
becomes personalized. Opportunities for material attainment are assumed to be available 
to everyone, just as long as one works hard enough and makes proper investment for the 
future.  
When neo-liberal thinking is conflated with organizing the government, a natural 
consequence is the erosion of public services as we know them (Smith 2007). People do 
not want to fund what they see as a “free ticket” for people who prefer to remain 
dependent upon public support rather than be self-sufficient, especially when these 
“freeloaders” are assumed to be black and poor (Gilens 1999; Neubeck and Cazenave 
2001). Despite the fact that the United States has the lowest tax rates of any industrialized 
nation (Nibert 2000), American anti-tax resentment, rationalized by neo-liberal thought, 
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flourishes for such reasons. Such resentment has produced tangible results in the U.S. tax 
code too. 
Since the “taxpayer revolt” of the 1970s, both federal and state revenues have 
steadily declined, with those occupying higher class statuses (in terms of both wealth and 
income) receiving the most tax relief (Nibert 2000). What this means is that taxes have 
taken on a more regressive nature in which marginalized groups pay higher proportions 
of their income and wealth than do affluent groups and corporations. Not only has this 
burdened marginalized groups with an unfair share of taxation, but it has reduced the 
money pool available for federal and state government finance.  
Economic Aspects of Neo-Liberalism 
The money pool for financing public services is further reduced when we consider 
how the U.S. economy has transformed since the 1970s. In neo-liberal fashion, the so-
called “free market” (i.e., large corporate interests) has transformed the dominant mode 
of production in the name of de-industrialization, de-regulation, and privatization 
(Eisenstein 2009). The free movement of capital across the globe has helped spur 
globalization, maximize profits for elite interests, and mobilize labor (Golash-Boza and 
Parker 2008). How has this affected the U.S.? 
Large urban centers, like Chicago, have consequently shifted their manufacturing-
based economies to service-oriented ones (Sassen 1990; Wilson 1987). This transition 
has left many unemployed or underemployed as work has simply disappeared. The 
remaining work available can be characterized by what has been labeled “McJobs” 
(Ritzer [1993] 2011). Such jobs typically pay low wages, have few opportunities for 
advancement, and employ a readily dispensable or replaceable workforce. Not only are 
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people confronted with monetary hardship, but this consequently adds to economic 
strains for the government. McJobs do not lend to larger tax bases that governments can 
draw from. The pool of potential tax revenue dwindles, yet public services must still be 
provided. 
The social and economic dimensions of neo-liberalism act as a coupled force 
creating a fragile condition for state-financed public services. Anti-tax resentment and 
service-oriented economies translate into little money to fund such things as healthcare, 
housing, and education. Because states must still provide these public services, 
alternative means of generating revenue must be established. State lotteries are among the 
few options available as a solution to this problem. And it helps that Americans love to 
gamble. 
Lotteries, High Stakes Public Financing 
Public support remains in high favor of state lotteries, as they are among the most 
popular forms of gambling by American adults (Gillespie 1999). In fact, one poll reports 
that approximately 46 percent of American adults purchased a lottery ticket within the 
past year (Jones 2009). Other figures show annual lottery ticket revenues throughout the 
nation’s forty-one state-operated lotteries total more than $40 billion, which averages 
$212 per adult residing in a lottery state and $372 per household (Guryan and Kearney 
2009).  
In Illinois, lottery sales surpassed record-breaking totals for the seventh straight 
year during the 2009 fiscal year: approximately $2.1 billion (“Illinois Lottery” 2010). Of 
these revenues, 30 percent was allocated to the Common School Fund, which is the 
primary source for financing public primary and secondary education in Illinois; the 
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remaining money was designated for the lottery’s operating costs, prize winnings, and 
other expenses (“State of Illinois” 2010). See Figure 1 for a breakdown of where lottery-
generated revenues were expended, and see Figure 2 for an overview of how much 
lottery-generated money has been earmarked for Illinois public education over the past 
few years (“Illinois Lottery” 2005, 2009, 2010). For the 2009 fiscal year, 30 percent of 
lottery-generated revenues equated to approximately $625 million, which represents more 
than 20 percent of the state’s total budget for public education (“State of Illinois” 2009). 
In years past, these contributions have varied but remained significant: FY08–$657MM; 
FY07–$622MM; FY06–$670MM; FY05–$619MM; FY04–$570MM; FY03–$540MM 
(“Illinois Lottery” 2005; 2009). As these figures show, the IL is a money-making 
machine when it comes to public education finance. 
Figure 1. Expenditures of Lottery-Generated Revenues, FY2009 
 
 
 
Source: “Illinois Lottery” 2010 
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Historically speaking, the IL is relatively new. It was created in 1973 by Illinois 
lawmakers for the purpose of providing supplemental funding for education (Gribben and 
Bean 2005). This promise, however, has not been kept. Since its inception, the IL has 
done little to supplement or provide additional funds to the state’s public education. In 
1985, state policymakers passed additional legislation to guarantee public education 
received its earmarked revenues from the lottery (Borg and Mason 1988). Even with the 
passage of this additional legislation, the IL has not increased or provided the additional 
support as originally promised. Instead, lottery revenues have displaced other sources of 
revenue that had previously financed the state’s public education (Borg and Mason 
1988). 
Figure 2. Lottery Revenues Earmarked for IL Public Education, FY2004-2008 
 
 
 
Source: “Illinois Lottery” 2005, 2009 
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Today, the state government of Illinois finds itself in a position of economic 
dependency. The state is confronted with budgetary shortfalls, the contemporary 
economic outlook is uncertain, and no alternatives are readily available for generating 
large sums of money. In this context, the state is an “instant winner” when it can reduce 
tax increases and rely upon the lottery to consistently provide hundreds of millions of 
dollars every year. Without these funds, Illinois public education would likely suffer. For 
these reasons, among others, the IL shows no signs of being abandoned or replaced any 
time soon.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE LOTTERY TAX: GENERATED FROM AND EXPENDED UPON WHOM? 
Because lottery-generated revenues are monies collected by the state and then 
expended upon a public service, like education, I, like others such as Nibert (2000), 
define the lottery as a mechanism of taxation. Unlike other forms of taxation, lottery-
generated revenues depend upon “voluntary” participation. It is not imposed like 
property, sales, and income taxes. Rather, it is an “implicit” form of taxation that people 
can elect to pay by purchasing lottery tickets (Clotfelter and Cook 1989). The 
requirement of voluntary participation does not negate the fact that the lottery is a 
mechanism of taxation. Revenues carry the same value regardless of how the state 
collects them (Clotfelter and Cook 1989). 
But from whom do the lottery-generated revenues primarily come? If 
advertisements are any indication, they come from marginalized groups such as the poor 
and minority racial groups. Consider one IL billboard advertisement from the mid-1980s. 
As reported by Barry Cronin (1986) of the Chicago Sun-Times, it read “How to go from 
Washington Boulevard to Easy Street–Play the Illinois State Lottery.” This sign was 
located at 2300 W. Washington Blvd., which at the time was a poverty-stricken, 
predominately black neighborhood. Though similar advertisements with various local 
street names were posted throughout the state, Ronald Koziol and Dave Schneidman 
(1986) of the Chicago Tribune reported that these ads were not nearly as effective
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compared to ads located in urban areas where mostly black, socio-economically 
disadvantaged people were heavily concentrated. Similar ads were virtually ineffective in 
suburban areas where neighborhoods were predominately both white and wealthy.  
Another suggesstive IL advertisement includes a campaign that delivers a similar 
message. As Robert Goodman details (1995), billboards were selectively placed in low-
income, predominately minority-concentrated areas and tauntingly read, “This could be 
your ticket out.” Such ads appeal to elusive dreams of fortune for people located in 
marginalized social positions. Consequently, they encourage many to make bad bets in 
which the house almost always wins. 
Unlike Robin Hood, the lottery swindles money from the poor and gives it back to 
the rich. As Mark Thornton (1999) aptly describes, lotteries represent a Sheriff of 
Nottingham tax because of their regressive nature. That is, lottery players with fewer 
resources of income and wealth spend more money (in real dollar amounts and in 
proportions to income and wealth) on lottery tickets compared to their socioeconomically 
advantaged counterparts. Numerous studies corroborate this finding (see Blalock, Just, 
and Simon 2007; Borg and Mason 1988; Borg, Mason, and Shapiro 1991; Combs, Kim, 
and Spry 2008; McCrary and Pavlak 2002; Price and Novak 1999; Stranahan and Borg 
1998).  
Though most of the literature suggests the lottery is a regressive source of 
revenue, this finding has not achieved consensus. Three studies are worth noting. One is 
particular to Illinois, the other regards Colorado, and the last one has national relevance. 
In Illinois, John Mikesell (1989) found that income has a proportional relationship to 
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lottery play throughout all income levels. In other words, the more money a person makes 
the more frequently he or she plays the lottery. This counters the numerous findings 
referenced above, which virtually conclude that the poor play more. In Colorado, Ann 
Hansen (1995) found a positive relationship between a person’s education and lottery 
play. Essentially, her data showed that people with higher education attainment purchase 
comparably more lottery tickets. Moreover, a national Gallup poll shows further 
inconsistencies. As opposed to being a regressive source of revenue, Jack Ludwig (1999) 
reports that the lottery may actually be a progressive tax structure. This poll shows that a 
larger proportion of people with higher income and education attainment play the lottery 
compared to their socioeconomically disadvantaged counterparts. In light of these 
inconsistent findings, more empirical investigation is needed to determine whether lottery 
represents a socioeconomically regressive source of revenue. 
Further inconsistencies remain when race and ethnicity are introduced. Some 
studies identify no difference among whites, blacks, or Hispanics in the frequency of 
their overall lottery play (McCrary and Pavlak 2002; Stranahan and Borg 1998). These 
same studies do show, however, that blacks disproportionately spend more money on 
lottery products. Cook and Clotfelter (1993) confirm this trend. Though many studies are 
available detailing the lottery play of whites versus blacks, considerably fewer studies 
that include Hispanics are available. Notable exceptions include Hansen’s (1995) study of 
Colorado lottery play and Price and Novak’s (1999) study of Texas lottery play. In both 
these studies, scholars found that Hispanics spend more money on particular lottery 
products that cost less and yield smaller rewards like “Instant Win” tickets. Aside from 
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whites, blacks, and Hispanics, other racial and ethnic groups are virtually absent from the 
literature. Therefore, more empirical analysis is needed to determine not only if the 
lottery is a socioeconomically regressive source of revenue, but if, and to what extent, the 
lottery is regressive for different racial groups. If it is, then this means that certain groups 
absorb the brunt of financing a considerable portion of Illinois public education. 
The Lottery Tax, Expended on Whom? 
Many critics of the lottery call it exploitative, inequitable, and unjust. While this 
position may resonate with many people’s moral reservations about the lottery, such a 
conclusion remains premature without empirical substantiation. For this position to be 
proven, evidence detailing not only who plays the lottery but who benefits from lottery-
funded services is needed. In economic terms, this analysis is known as the economic 
incidence of the lottery, which involves simultaneously measuring how revenues are 
generated and expended. To my knowledge, few studies are inclusive of such an analysis. 
Borg, Mason, and Shapiro (1991) corroborate this as they argue that a majority of lottery 
studies have “looked at only half the issue–the tax side of incidence” (p. 15). That is, 
most studies examine the generation of lottery revenues, but not how these funds are 
spent. While this area of research is relatively underdeveloped, it is worthwhile pointing 
out the few innovative studies that have taken such an approach. 
Case studies measuring the economic incidence of the lottery include the states of 
Georgia, Illinois, and Florida. Each of these studies measures the net tax liability for 
households residing within the state. In Georgia, McCrary and Pavlak (2002) found 
residents earning less spend proportionally more of their incomes on lottery tickets than 
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those with higher incomes. Also, they conclude lottery-funded programs such as higher 
education HOPE scholarships disproportionately benefit those who would attend college 
with or without financial assistance.  
In Illinois, Borg and Mason (1988) report similar results. They argue the lottery is 
a bad bet for two reasons. Like other studies, they found that lower income households 
play the lottery more frequently than their counterparts. But these authors go further to 
argue that all Illinois households are shortchanged by the lottery, regardless of income 
level. This is because Illinois households contribute more tax revenues through lottery 
play than they receive from lottery-earmarked expenditures to public education. 
Whereas case studies of Georgia and Illinois yield consistent findings, the case of 
Florida paints a somewhat different picture. Borg, Mason, and Shapiro (1991) found that 
most households, regardless of income level, enjoyed a net gain from lottery 
expenditures. In other words, most Florida households received more lottery-generated 
expenditures on education than they contributed. However, this trend has one exception: 
Households earning less than $10,000 annually. Households in this income range spend 
more money on the lottery than they receive in expenditures. Therefore, the lottery is a 
losing bet for households in the lowest income group. But other households are “instant 
winners.” 
As these studies indicate, the lottery is like a Sheriff of Nottingham tax. To 
varying extents, it takes from the poor and gives to the rich. These studies do an apt job 
of showing how capital is transferred away from one or more groups and allocated to 
another group or groups. Though these studies are highly suggestive, more 
15 
 
comprehensive evidence is needed to conclude whether the lottery is exploitative, 
inequitable, and unjust. Despite their innovative efforts, these pioneering studies (and 
lottery studies in general) remain limited in a number of ways. And it is this subject to 
which I now turn my attention. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LOTTERY STUDIES: A BRIEF CRITIQUE 
Lottery studies are limited by substantive shortcomings. As Roberto Garvía 
(2007) notes, the literature remains largely absent of a sociological perspective. Instead, 
much has been written by those in the fields of economics, political science, public 
policy, and business administration. Moreover, lottery studies lack a race perspective. 
Either lottery scholars dismiss race from their analysis or they narrowly address race by 
acknowledging it as a peripheral, not central, subject.1 When this happens, lottery 
scholars underscore the continuing significance of race and how lotteries (re)produce 
racial inequality. In terms of the IL and ISBE, racial inequality is (re)produced when the 
state generates revenues from some groups and allocates them to others. 
Not only have researchers underscored the significance of race as it relates to the 
regressive nature of lotteries, but researchers that do address race have traditionally done 
so in dichotomous fashion. Instead of recognizing multiple groups, most studies rely on 
binary analyses addressing only two groups. Such an approach overlooks many racial 
groups, and thus is over-simplistic. For instance, Borg and Mason (1988) and Borg, 
Mason, and Shapiro (1991) analyze race as if this category is comprised of two groups: 
 
1 Many researchers overemphasize socioeconomic indicators of class, while they treat 
race as an “afterthought” variable (see Blalock, Just, and Simon 2007; Borg, Mason, and 
Shapiro 1991). Still, others omit race from their analysis altogether (see Combs, Kim, and 
Spry 2008). 
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whites and nonwhites. A similar problem confronts McCrary and Pavlak (2002) because 
they analyze race as if it is comprised of blacks and nonblacks. As these strategies show, 
racial groups are collapsed in dichotomous fashion into umbrella racial categories. This is 
problematic because, as Bonilla-Silva and Embrick (2006) contend, the growing presence 
of other groups aside from whites and blacks nuances racial stratification in the U.S. The 
increased representation of groups such as Hispanics, Asians, multiracials, among others 
redraws the color line, and it complicates how political, cultural, and social power is 
distributed. Therefore, when researchers follow a dichotomous analysis of race, they not 
only exclude significant populations of racial others but they oversimplify racial 
inequality in the U.S. 
 While lottery studies have substantive shortcomings in terms of race, many are 
also limited by inherent methodological problems. A number of methods undertaken by 
lottery scholars undermine the findings their studies have produced and what conclusions 
they have drawn. Briefly, I address some of these problems and follow-up by suggesting 
alternative methodological approaches. 
 To begin, many lottery studies rely on two modes of data collection: mail surveys 
(see Borg, Mason, and Shapiro 1991) and telephone interviews (see Borg and Mason 
1988; McCrary and Pavlak 2002; Stranahan and Borg 1998). Each approach poses unique 
concerns. When data is collected via mail or telephone surveys, several assumptions are 
made about the studied population. Those who utilize mail surveys assume potential 
research participants reside in a permanent dwelling, while those who utilize telephone 
interviews assume potential participants not only have a permanent dwelling but a 
landline telephone located within that dwelling. Given the regressive nature of lotteries, 
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these assumptions can significantly impair a study’s ability to tap the appropriate 
population and generalize beyond the sampled population.  
Such shortcomings are apparent in studies performed by McCrary and Pavlek 
(2002) and Borg, Mason, and Shapiro (1991). In the former, data was collected via the 
telephone interview. Not only did this approach gain a 51.3 percent response rate, but 
only 51 percent of participants were active lottery players. That is, only half of half the 
sampled population played the lottery. Furthermore, this sample was oversaturated by 
whites, females, and homeowners, which the authors found to be the groups least likely 
to play the lottery. Similar problems confront Borg, Mason, and Shapiro’s (1991) study, 
which utilizes mail surveys. Such an approach is notorious for its low response rates, 
which are typically ranked at the bottom of all modes of data collection (Czaja and Blair 
2005). This trend holds true for Borg, Mason, and Shapiro (1991) as they reported a 
dismal response rate of 17.8 percent. When response rates are so low, the quality of the 
survey and study design come into question. 
 Simply said, much work remains in the area of lottery studies. Though the critique 
I have offered is not exhaustive, it does outline some of the substantive and 
methodological limitations within the current body of lottery studies. Bearing these 
shortcomings in mind, new research designs should practice ingenuity and innovation to 
avoid problems of the past and progress what knowledge lottery studies have to offer. For 
my study design, I attempt to do just that. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A CHICAGO CASE STUDY: PURPOSE AND METHODS 
Because my analytic goals are twofold, the methodological design is organized in 
phases. My research agenda is to venture where few, if any, lottery and race scholars 
have gone: Analyze the racialized economic incidence of the lottery. This entails 
simultaneously examining the generation and appropriation of lottery revenues, with 
respect to the racial makeup of the communities involved in this money-exchange 
process. By assessing the generation of lottery revenues, I attempt to determine to what 
extent these funds are racially regressive. In the second phase of analysis, I critically 
examine how lottery-generated funds are distributed to Illinois public education.  
Sampling Frame 
To measure the economic incidence of the lottery, I rely upon spatial analysis of 
zip code tabulation areas (ZCTAs). Within the city of Chicago, there are, according to the 
2000 Census, 55 ZCTAs. However, not all these areas are included in my analysis. I 
employed a sampling scheme that considers the racial composition of the population age 
18 years and older for each ZCTA, and if a ZCTA meets a certain racial makeup then it is 
included in my analysis.  
Drawing from the work of Krysan and Brader (2009), I created a taxonomy (see 
Table 1) to determine which ZCTAs were sampled. In it, I focus on four groups: whites, 
blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. Because other groups lack a statistically significant
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portion of the population, as recorded by census data, they are excluded from focus. (See 
Table 2 for a list of the sampled ZCTAs and their associated Community Areas; see 
APPENDIX A for supplementary demographic data profiling these ZCTAs.) 
Table 1. Typology of Chicago ZCTAs by Racial/Ethnic Composition* 
All white communities where 85 percent or more of residents or students are white only 
 
Mostly white communities where 70 percent or more of residents or students are white only and there  
are fewer than 15 percent of any single other race 
 
All Asian communities where 85 percent or more of residents or students are Asian only 
 
Mostly Asian communities where 70 percent or more of residents or students are Asian only and there  
are fewer than 15 percent of any single other race 
 
All Hispanic communities where 85 percent or more of residents or students are Hispanic only 
 
Mostly Hispanic communities where 70 percent or more of residents or students are Hispanic only and  
there are fewer than 15 percent of any single other race 
 
All black communities where 85 percent or more of residents or students are black only 
 
Mostly black communities where 70 percent or more of residents or students are black only and there  
are fewer than 15 percent of any single other race 
 
* Population that is 18 years and older. 
 
For my purposes, a ZCTA-based analysis is sufficed because of Chicago’s high 
levels of segregation. This city remains among the most racially segregated cities in the 
United States (Lewis Mumford Center 2001). Therefore, a ZCTA-to-ZCTA comparison 
is also inherently a comparison of racial groups and their residential communities. 
According to Massey and Denton (1993), housing segregation, which generally refers to 
the tendency for racial groups to live apart, can be distinguished as having five distinct 
dimensions according to geography: unevenness, spatial isolation, clustering, 
centralization, and concentration. If four out of five of these dimensions characterize a 
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geographic area then hypersegregation, or segregation at much exaggerated levels, is 
present. Chicago is characterized by such a label (Massey and Denton 1993).1  
Segregation in housing corresponds with segregation in education because, as 
McKoy and Vincent (2006) point out, these two “have always been organically 
connected” (p. 143). Public school enrollment is generally organized by the geographic 
proximity of residence to school location (McKoy and Vincent 2006; Orfield and Lee 
2005). Public education in Chicago follows this trend. Because race is a salient 
determinant of where someone lives within Chicago, school enrollments are racially 
divided across schools (Sohoni and Saporito 2009). The racial isolation of blacks and 
Hispanics in public schools is further exacerbated considering that whites are much more 
likely to attend private schools (Sohoni and Saporito 2009). In short, Chicago’s high level 
 
1 A brief comment on the housing debate between race and class is warranted here. Some 
sociologists attribute the persistence of segregation within Chicago as resulting from 
economic, not racial, forces (e.g. Wilson 1978; 1987). However, Massey and Denton 
(1993) show how racial minorities, particularly blacks and some Puerto Ricans, are 
relegated to live alongside other minorities, regardless of class measures such as 
household income level.  
My stance differs from both these positions: It is not the salience of class over race, or 
vice versa, that maintains segregation. Instead, it is the convergent and interlocking 
nature of race and class that maintains segregation. To illustrate my point, consider 
Oliver and Shaprio’s ([1995] 2006) Black Wealth/ White Wealth. Limiting their analysis 
to the black-white racial dichotomy, these authors show how blacks are cumulatively 
disadvantaged in the housing market, while whites are cumulatively advantaged. Blacks 
are more likely to be discriminated against in supposedly open housing markets, steered 
to poverty-stricken, heavily black-concentrated neighborhoods, denied loans despite 
possessing comparably equivalent measures of credit-worthiness, charged much higher 
interest rates once those loans are approved, reside in homes that appreciate value at 
significantly lower rates than their white counterparts, and transfer significantly lower 
values of accumulated wealth to succeeding generations. 
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of segregation in both housing and education enables a ZCTA-based sampling frame to 
be adequate for my analytic purposes.  
Table 2. Selected Chicago ZCTAs and their Associated Community Areas* 
All White 
60614 Lincoln Park, Logan Square 
60631  Edison Park, Norwood Park 
60646 Forest Glen, Jefferson Park, North Park, Norwood Park 
60655 Beverly, Morgan Park, Mount Greenwood 
60656 O’Hare 
Mostly White 
 60601  The Loop 
 60611  Near North Side 
60613 Lakeview, North Center, Uptown 
60630 Albany Park, Forest Glen, Irving Park, Jefferson Park, Portage Park 
60634 Belmont Cragin, Dunning, Monteclare, Portage Park 
60638 Clearing, Garfield Ridge 
60657 Lakeview, North Center 
All Black 
60619 Avalon Park, Burnside, Calumet Heights, Chatham, Greater Grand Crossing, 
Roseland, South Shore 
60620 Auburn Gresham, Beverly, Chatham, Greater Grand Crossing, Roseland, 
Washington Heights 
60621 Englewood, Greater Grand Crossing, Washington Park 
60624 East Garfield Park, Humboldt Park, North Lawndale, West Garfield Park 
60628 Pullman, Roseland, Washington Heights, West Pullman 
60636 Chicago Lawn, Gage Park, West Englewood 
60644 Austin 
60649 South Shore 
60653 Douglas, Grand Boulevard, Kenwood, Oakland 
Mostly Black 
 60637  Greater Grand Crossing, Hyde Park, South Shore, Washington Park, Woodlawn 
 60643  Beverly, Morgan Park, Washington Heights, West Pullman 
 60651  Austin, Humboldt Park 
Mostly Hispanic 
 60632  Archer Heights, Brighten Park, Gage Park, Garfield Ridge, West Elsdon 
 
Source: “Chicago Tribune” 2011 
* ZCTA 60654 has a total of 7 listed residents. Because this population is statistically insignificant, it is 
omitted from analysis.  
In total, 26 ZTCAs meet the outlined criteria set forth in the typology. One of 
these (60654) is removed from analysis, however, because it is statistically significant; it 
has only seven residents. Of the remaining 25 ZCTAs, five are “all white,” seven are 
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“mostly white,” nine are “all black,” three are “mostly black,” and one is “mostly 
Hispanic.” A majority of the white ZCTAs fall on the north and northwest sides of the 
city, while a majority of the black ZCTAs fall in Chicago’s traditional “black belt” areas: 
the west and south sides. Only one mostly Hispanic ZCTA was selected, and it is located 
on the southwest side.2 (For a map of the ZCTAs included in my analysis, see Figure 3.) 
Mode of Data Collection 
The analytic logic driving this study is to “follow the money.” In other words, I 
detail where lottery revenues originate and how they are then distributed. To accomplish 
this task, I collect data from various sources, including census data and other public 
records. The 2000 Census is tapped as the source for demographic data of residents per 
each ZCTA. Data concerning the generation of lottery revenues was collected via 
 
2 The fact that only one Hispanic community was selected can be explained, in part, by 
newly emerging census trends. The number of Hispanics who solely identify (ethnically 
and racially) as such is dwindling. In fact, nearly half of Hispanics racially identified as 
white during the 2000 Census (Michael and Timberlake 2008). Some have attributed this 
trend to the notion that Hispanics are experiencing a “whitening effect,” in which they are 
increasingly self-selecting as white, marrying and reproducing with whites, residing 
alongside whites in residential neighborhoods, and achieving socioeconomic mobility 
that is more comparable to whites than blacks (Gallagher 2004; Yancey 2003). A 
significant number of Hispanics, however, reject identifying with a racial category 
altogether by opting for “some other race” or skipping the question. This can be 
explained by the fact that many Hispanics, especially Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, 
answer survey questions regarding race and ethnicity as mere substitutes for one another, 
rather than distinctly different (Perez 2008). Logan (2004) has labeled this particular 
group the “Hispanic Hispanics.” They tend to be darker-skinned and have lower 
socioeconomic attainment levels compared to whites and other lighter-skinned Hispanics 
(Bonilla-Silva and Embrick 2006; Michael and Timberlake 2008). The ZCTA included in 
my sample meets such criteria. 
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institutional audit of the IL, while data concerning the distribution of lottery revenues was 
collected via institutional audit of the ISBE. 
Figure 3. Map of Selected Chicago ZCTAs, 2000 
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All demographic data collected from the 2000 Census is readily available online.3 
This census data represents the most comprehensive dataset that details the demographics 
of residents living within each Chicago ZCTA. (For a brief methodological critique of the 
U.S. Census, see APPENDIX B.) Though census data can be collected with relative ease, 
information regarding the generation and distribution of lottery revenues entailed more 
difficulty. 
Financial records detailing the amounts of lottery-generated revenue per ZCTA 
were obtained after performing an institutional audit of the IL (see APPENDIX C for the 
formal request). This audit was performed in accordance of Illinois Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), or 5 ILCS 140, guidelines (see Madigan 2004).4 Because 
lottery-generated revenues are partially used to finance a public service provided by the 
state, financial documents that detail them constitute public records of interest. According 
to FOIA, this makes them available to the public upon request. 
In addition to requesting financial records of lottery-generated revenues, I also 
collected documentation of how public education is funded in Illinois. Like census data, 
this information is publicly available online.5 The process by which the state funds public 
education is made explicit in Public Act 90-548, which outlines the General State Aid 
 
3 This dataset can be accessed online. Decennial census data for the 2000 Census is 
available at http://factfinder.census.gov/. All census data utilized for this study came from 
Summary Files 1 and 3 (“U.S. Census Bureau” 2001a, 2001b). 
4 Financial records were requested in electronic format, rather than in physical document 
form. 
 
5 This data was accessed at ISBE’s website: http://www.isbe.state.il.us/funding/pdf/ 
gsa_overview.pdf. 
26 
 
                                                           
(GSA) formula used by the ISBE to distribute funds across the state. I have purposefully 
chosen to analyze this law rather than show where lottery-generated funds are expended. 
This is because “tracking” the money is virtually impossible given how state government 
has organized its finance structure scheme for public education.6
 
6 Bluntly put, the finance process of Illinois public education is similar to a money 
laundering scheme. This is because the Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR) disguises 
the origins of earmarked revenues for education through its overly-simplistic accounting 
practices. First, IDOR generates money for education from numerous sources, including 
the private sector as well as the state and federal government, and then it transfers this 
money into one general education fund–the Common School Fund (Johnson 1999; “State 
of Illinois” 2009). Once money is located here, the ISBE redistributes it to finance public 
education (“State of Illinois” 2009). This finance scheme is obscured when the state 
lumps several sources of money into one pool, distributes this pool across several 
locations, and then fails to keep a ledger to show where money is spent with respect to 
where it originated. Because of this laundering-like finance scheme, it is virtually 
impossible to track where lottery-generated revenues are spent. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RACIALIZED ECONOMIC INCIDENCE OF THE ILLINOIS LOTTERY 
My analytic goals are to measure the racial regressivity of lottery-generated 
revenues in Chicago and evaluate how these funds are then distributed. My first goal is 
accomplished by performing ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis, while my 
second goal is met by critically examining the formula by which state funds are 
appropriated. When these analyses are combined, they complement one another to 
“follow the money” and show where lottery revenues originate and how they are 
expended. Therefore, the completion of these tasks lends a better understanding of the IL 
in Chicago and its racialized economic incidence. 
Generation of Lottery Revenues 
To evaluate social factors associated with lottery-generated revenues, I utilized 
OLS regression. This analytic method permits me to gain a more nuanced understanding 
of how multiple variables simultaneously, but independently affect the outcome of lottery 
sales. In total, I provide four models of regression analysis. In each model the 
independent variables remain constant, but the outcome variable changes according to 
annual lottery sales. Fiscal years 1999 through 2002 are included. What these multiple 
models yield is a more detailed analysis, one that allows trends of annual lottery sales of 
ZCTAs to be compared over time. Such an approach lends to a more conclusive study 
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since many, rather than one, “snapshots” are considered.1  
Because my unit of analysis is the ZCTA, I rely upon group summary statistics 
for independent (and dependent) variables. Situating my research within the literature, I 
am primarily interested in how race affects lottery sales. However, I also give 
considerable attention to class. Three independent variables are of interest to my analysis, 
two that are indicative of class and one of race. In terms of class, I measure education 
attainment per ZCTA by considering the percentage of the community that has obtained a 
bachelor’s degree or higher, while I measure income by considering the mean household 
income per ZCTA. In terms of race, I measure the racial/ethnic composition of each 
ZCTA according to the typology (Table 1) mentioned above. This permits me to compare 
communities that are predominantly comprised by one group to communities 
predominantly comprised by another group. All the while, I control for population size of 
those 18 years and older living within each ZCTA. This variable is included as a control 
for two reasons. One, I am only interested in those 18 and older because this population 
represents the potential tax base for lottery sales given that minors are legally prohibited 
from playing. And two, ZCTAs with much larger populations are likely to purchase more 
lottery tickets due to the sheer fact that they have a larger pool of potential players. For 
results of this analysis, see Table 3. 
 
 
1 These years have been purposefully selected to compare two sources of data that were 
collected at different points in time. U.S. Census data are collected decennially, while 
lottery revenues are recorded annually. By comparing census data from 2000 to annual 
lottery revenues from fiscal years 1999 through 2002, my analysis yields more precision 
by cross-examining data collected at similar points in time. 
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Table 3. OLS Regression Models of Lottery Sales per ZCTA 
 
    FY 1999  FY 2000  FY 2001  FY 2002 
Independent Variables 
Education   -195,350 -193,243 -184,213 -189,289 
 Population with a  (58,198)  (59,279)  (58,764)  (63,518) 
 BS, BA, or Higher,   
 per ZCTA (in percents)  
 
Income    192  193  187  189 
 Mean Household  (69)  (70)  (69)  (78) 
 Income, per ZCTA    
 (in dollars)   
 
Race/Ethnicity   2,228,913 2,329,109 2,317,587 2,273,998 
 Racial/Ethnic  (517,712) (527,323) (522,748) (565,033) 
 Composition,      
 per ZCTA  
 (5-Point Scale)* 
 
Control Variable 
Tax Base Population  194  184  179  189 
 Population Aged  (37)  (38)  (37)  (40) 
 18 and Older, per      
 ZCTA (in percents)  
 
Constant   -10,683,770 -10,756,959 -10,745,463    -10,504,884 
Pearson’s R   .892  .888  .885  .873 
R2    .796  .788  .784  .762 
Std Error of the Estimate  2,773,779 2,825,274 2,800,763 3,027,314  
N (ZCTAs)   25  25  25  25  
Note: Main entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (B) with their standard errors listed below in 
parentheses.  
* The 5-Point Nominal Scale is measured according to the typology outlined in Table One. Its values are as follows: 1 
– All White; 2 – Mostly White; 3 – Mostly Hispanic; 4 – Mostly Black; 5 – All Black. 
 
 Table 3 presents much information, but what does it all mean? First, I begin by 
explaining the analytic purpose of each piece of statistical information provided, then my 
discussion transitions into what this information collectively means. The main entries 
listed include unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors of the regression 
coefficients. An unstandardized coefficient represents the predicted change in the 
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dependent variable associated with a one-unit change in a particular independent variable, 
when all other independent variables are held constant (Lewis-Beck 1980). Simply put, 
this coefficient is the slope of a regression line. Consider an example from the first model 
(FY 1999). When a ZCTA’s racial/ethnic composition shifts from all white to mostly 
white, mostly white to mostly Hispanic, mostly Hispanic to mostly black, or mostly black 
to all black, annual lottery sales per ZCTA increase by $2,228,913, when measures of 
income and education are controlled. Therefore, an all black ZCTA contributes 
$11,144,565 more annual lottery revenues than an all white ZCTA when income and 
education are held constant. Trends of the unstandardized regression coefficients for 
Racial/Ethnic Composition per ZCTA remained consistent across all four models. 
“Blacker” communities contribute the most money to the lottery tax, while “whiter” 
communities contribute least. Hispanic communities fall in-between these groups, 
contributing more than “whiter” communities but less than “blacker” communities. (See 
Figure 4 for an overview of these trends.)  
It should be noted that the unstandardized coefficients of the models should be 
interpreted with caution. Because multicollinearity exists among the independent 
variables, particularly between the measures for education and income, these coefficients 
are vulnerable to estimation error. “The multicollinearity problem” simply refers to when 
independent variables within a model are highly correlated; its presence causes standard 
errors for each independent variable’s unstandardized coefficient to range broadly 
(Lewis-Beck 1980). The presence of multicollinearity, however, does not fully dismiss 
my findings altogether. I remain confident that the lottery remains a racially regressive 
source of revenue given the supplemental tests I have performed measuring the degree of 
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existing multicollinearity (see APPENDIX D). Furthermore, reliability of the models 
remains intact, as overall predictability of the outcomes is not affected (Lewis-Beck 
1980). 
Figure 4. Unstandardized Coefficients for Racial/Ethnic Composition per ZCTA 
 
 
Note: An unstandardized regression coefficient represents the predicted change in the dependent variable associated 
with a one-unit change in a particular independent variable, when all other independent variables are held constant. 
Simply put, this coefficient is the slope of a regression line. The above graph illustrates the shift in annual lottery sales 
per ZCTA when a ZCTA’s racial/ethnic composition shifts one-unit (e.g., mostly black to all black), when measures of 
income and education are controlled. The “Mostly Hispanic” ZCTA represents the baseline comparison. 
The second main entry includes the standard error of the unstandardized 
regression coefficient, which simply refers to the average estimated error. Using the same 
example from the FY 1999 model, I estimate that the standard error of the unstandardized 
regression coefficient is $517,712. This means that for each one-unit shift in racial/ethnic 
composition per ZCTA the change in annual lottery sales per ZCTA ranges from 
1,711,201 to 2,746,625, when the other independent variables are held constant. 
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Below the main entries are various other statistics that lend a more comprehensive 
analysis. The first is the constant, which value represents the y-intercept. Its function is to 
account for what is not accounted for by the independent variables (Lewis-Beck 1980). 
That is, its value makes up the difference on the dependent variable for what remains 
uncalculated by the independent variables.  
The next statistic provided is Pearson’s R, which is short for Pearson’s 
correlations coefficient. This statistic is commonly used to describe how well the model 
“fits” the data. (Norušis 2008). It ranges from -1 to +1, and this scale measures how close 
cases cluster to the regression line. If the value is +1 then all the cases fall along the 
positive regression line, and if the value is -1 then all the cases fall along the negative 
regression line. Because the Pearson’s R statistic approximates .9 in all four models 
above, this indicates that strong, positive linear relationships exist between the 
independent and dependent variables. 
 Listed below Pearson’s R is R2, which refers to “explained variance.” Essentially, 
this statistic is a comparison of the actual observations versus predicted observations. It 
“tells you what proportion of the variability of the dependent variable is ‘explained’ by 
the regression model” (Norušis 2008). For the various models above, the R2 statistic 
approaches .80. This means that the models consistently explain nearly 80 percent of the 
variability for annual lottery revenues. 
 The standard error of the estimate refers to the prediction error of the dependent 
variable. This statistic is calculated by comparing the standard deviation of the observed 
outcome with the predicted outcome (Lewis-Beck 1980). This value enables researchers 
to construct confidence intervals, which is essentially a range of where some predicted 
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outcome falls. It is a probability-driven estimate. For the models above, the standard error 
of the estimate ranges between $2.7 and $3.0 million. 
All these statistics taken together, regression analysis yields several results that 
are of interest to me. It enables me to measure the effects of independent variables, 
disassociated from other independent variables, on some dependent variable. In theory, 
regression analysis allows researchers to disentangle and measure “race effects” from 
“class effects” (Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi 2008; Oliver and Shapiro [1995] 2006). It 
also lends a means of analysis that can assess how race operates simultaneously alongside 
other variables, since it rarely exists in a vacuum disconnected from other factors such as 
class (Bonilla-Silva 2001). Through the equation that expresses OLS regression analysis, 
I can perform these analytic tasks. This equation is diagramed below (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. OLS Regression Equation for Models of Lottery Sales per ZCTA 
 
 
The formula of OLS regression analysis is a linear estimation that models the 
relationship between some dependent variable and various independent variables. 
Pertaining to my analysis, it estimates how race, education, and income affect annual 
lottery sales, per ZCTA. Whereas the unstandardized regression coefficients are like 
small pieces of a puzzle, the OLS linear equation represents the larger puzzle. In other 
words, it forecasts the level of annual lottery sales given particular values of the 
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independent variables. To better illustrate the relationship of race, income and education 
on annual lottery sales, I provide a number of graphs below (See Figures 6 through 9). 
For simplicity sake, however, I have omitted the standard error of the estimate from 
calculation. This means the outputs provided in the graphs are crude measures. These 
graphs nonetheless show linear predictions of annual lottery sales utilizing the formula 
outlined above.
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Substantively, what do these graphs illustrate?  It paints a consistent picture of 
how race “colors” annual lottery revenues. Annual lottery revenues per ZCTA increase 
accordingly by racial/ethnic composition at every income and education level. White 
ZCTAs spend less than Hispanic ZCTAs, and Hispanic ZCTAs spend less than black 
ZCTAs. This means that communities predominantly comprised by people of color pay 
significantly higher lottery taxes than do communities predominantly comprised by 
whites. Altogether, these graphs illustrate the racial/ethnic regressivity of the lottery 
irrespective of class status. 
Appropriation of Lottery-Generated Revenues 
The second phase of analysis involves an examination of how the ISBE finances 
public education. To do this, I evaluate the criteria outlined by the GSA formula. Based 
on previous research (see McKoy and Vincent 2006), education financing throughout 
much of the country is determined primarily by three factors: district property taxes, 
student enrollment, and average daily attendance (ADA). The state of Illinois is not much 
different.  
According to the GSA formula (see “ISBE” 2011), three criteria are considered in 
appropriating state funds to school districts, with some exceptions. (For a breakdown of 
how the ISBE generally finances public education, see Figure 10). The first criterion 
dictates that per pupil funding per district is based upon measures of local wealth. Such 
wealth primarily consists of revenue generated by property taxes, which is also known as 
Equalized Assessed Value (EAV) in Illinois. Depending upon levels of wealth, each 
district is appropriated a foundational level of funds per pupil. Impoverished districts are 
distributed more money than the wealthiest districts, which receive a flat rate. The second 
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criterion accounts for ADA. School districts with high attendance rates receive more 
money, while those with lower rates receive less money. The wealthiest school districts, 
however, receive a flat rate per pupil. The third criterion considers an additional 
provision for districts confronted with significant poverty. Districts with high poverty 
counts can receive additional state funding, but the amount of funding is determined by 
two factors: the district’s number of low-income residents and the average daily 
attendance of the district’s pupils. 
Figure 10. GSA Formula: How the ISBE Finances Public Education 
 
 
Source: “ISBE” 2011 
At face value, it seems as though the GSA formula embodies education finance 
policy that is both race-neutral and economically progressive. Each district’s financial 
ability without regard to race is considered before any state aid is appropriated. The three 
criteria outlined above show the state’s attempt to ensure districts that lack resources, as 
determined by the property tax base, have a foundational level of funding, while more 
affluent areas are obligated to fund their own district’s education. For those that do not 
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have ample means, the state intervenes to make up the difference and guarantee that each 
district has a minimum level of funding. As stated on the Illinois State Comptroller’s 
(N.d.) website, “The formula is designed to distribute more aid to poorer districts and a 
minimum amount to wealthier districts” (Para. 1).  
Intentions, however, are different from outcomes. Though Illinois education 
policy is intended to be race-neutral and economically progressive, its consequences can 
often be quite the opposite. Because the formula guarantees only a minimum level of 
funding, significant inequities remain due to disparate wealth gaps, which are inherently 
racialized, across districts. Critics argue that the formula relies too much on local 
property taxes (see “Center of Tax and Accountability” 2008). Wealthier districts, which 
tend to be white, can often pour more money into education than poorer districts, even 
when they receive substantially less state aid. This is among the points made in a recent 
lawsuit against the state spearheaded by the Chicago Urban League (2008). This 
organization has challenged Illinois’ financing mechanism as one that inherently ensures 
second-class education for some and first-class education for others. 
Progressive intentions of the GSA formula are further displaced when lottery-
generated revenues (and from whom they originate) are considered. Although such 
money constitutes a tax that finances a public service, it is not a criterion considered in 
the GSA formula. This is problematic for a number of reasons. Lottery revenues are not 
generated equally across Chicago, let alone the state of Illinois. As the regression models 
above show, the lottery is a regressive source of state income in terms of race. 
Communities predominately comprised by people of color contribute considerably more 
money to education via the lottery than do communities predominately comprised by 
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whites. Because the lottery is a racially regressive source of education finance, it offsets 
the distribution formula that is supposedly race-neutral. Racially marginalized 
communities are the primary source for lottery-generated revenues, so a considerable 
amount of money available to finance state education comes from these very same 
communities. Therefore, the formula ends up circulating capital out of areas 
predominantly comprised by people of color and spreading it across all areas. 
In a worst case scenario, racially marginalized communities end up subsidizing 
public education, a service that the entire state population is entitled. The GSA formula 
permits such an occurrence when it does not consider lottery-generated revenues (and 
from where they come) as a criterion for funding each district. Communities of color 
could collectively contribute more capital to education through the lottery (in addition to 
other sources of earmarked revenues for education) than predominantly white 
communities. When this occurs, financing public education becomes even more of a 
racially inequitable obligation. And these consequences can manifest themselves even 
despite intentions that are seemingly race-neutral and progressive.
  
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE LOTTERY: STATE-SPONSORED RACISM? 
Malcolm X would often tell his followers, “Racism is like a Cadillac, they bring 
out a new model every year” (cited in Lipsitz 1998:182). Although new models look 
much different than models of old, the fact of the matter is a Cadillac is still a Cadillac. 
Likewise, racism is still racism, regardless of how it has changed throughout the years. At 
its core, racism is about how racial categories become a central organizing principle of 
social circumstances and opportunities (Bonilla-Silva 2001; Feagin 2006; Omi and 
Winant 1994). Racial groups atop the hierarchy are enumerated many rewards, both 
symbolic and material, while other groups social liabilities based on their race. 
Throughout most of U.S. history (since European establishment), formal white 
supremacy has been endorsed by the state and many of its citizens to enforce an unequal 
distribution of resources (Bonilla-Silva 2001; Feagin 2006). In the modern era, the racial 
rule persists in ways that are institutional, covert, and seemingly colorblind, but no less 
effective (Bonilla-Silva 2001). The state-sponsored money-exchange process between the 
IL and ISBE is a particular example of this new racism because of its deeply racialized 
effects, and it is an area of study that remains virtually untouched by critical race 
scholars. 
As I have shown, the money-exchange process between the IL and ISBE 
exemplifies the racialization of state policy and a new model of racism. Finance policy of 
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Illinois public education generates and distributes lottery revenues in a way that preserves 
undeserved enrichment and unjust impoverishment along racial lines.1 Lottery-generated 
revenues are regressively generated in racial terms, so some communities of color 
contribute more money to education via the lottery than others. They are then distributed 
without considering from whom they originated through education finance. Such a 
process counters policy that is intentionally race-neutral and economically progressive. 
This is because lottery-generated revenues earmarked for education are circulated from 
communities of color and spread across all communities. Under the worst circumstances, 
communities of color are burdened with subsidizing public education. This is especially 
true when the amount of their lottery tax contributions eclipse other sources of public 
education finance. When lottery-generated revenues are distributed in such a way, 
racially inequitable distributions of economic capital are preserved. One community’s 
enrichment comes at the expense of another’s impoverishment. It represents a state-
sponsored money exchange process that captures one mechanism for reproducing racial 
inequality. Therefore, let us call this new Cadillac for what it is: Racism.
 
1 See Chapter One of Feagin’s (2000) Racist America for a thorough discussion of the 
concepts: unjust impoverishment and undeserved enrichment. Here, he further explains 
the concepts as they relate to a comprehensive perspective of systemic racism and the 
social reproduction of racial inequality, particularly white privilege and black burden. 
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While census data represents the most comprehensive dataset of demographic 
data for the Chicago area and is suitable for my analytic purposes, I do not fully endorse 
its method and data because of several unique problems it poses to this study. Here, I 
briefly highlight and critique some of these problems. Areas to be addressed include the 
timeliness of census data and issues concerning both internal and external validity. 
With regard to timeliness, U.S. Census data are collected decennially. Though 
these data yield ten-year cross-sections description of the population, they do not detail 
the dynamic shifts between these benchmarks. In terms of this study, this poses a 
problem. The absence of annual census data dilutes the precision of my analysis. Because 
census data are collected decennially but lottery sales annually, my analysis cross-
examines decennial data with annual data. To minimize this dilution, I cross-examine 
only four cross-sections of annual lottery sales with decennial census data. That is, annual 
lottery revenues data from fiscal years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 are be analyzed with 
respect to decennial census data from 2000.  Such a cross-examination better compares 
data collected from similar points in time. 
A concern regarding internal validity of census data regards the issue of defining 
racial group membership. Internal validity, as Creswell (2009) writes, refers to “the 
researcher’s ability to draw correct inferences from the data about the population” (p. 
162). Because race is a social construct, a correct way of defining race does not exist. 
Thus, James (2008) rightfully points out that the internal validity of census data comes 
into question because race and group membership are defined in a static manner (James 
2008). On the contrary, Omi and Winant (1994) show that racial boundaries are under 
constant (re)negotiation and the process of determining who belongs to what racial 
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category depends upon political context. Contrary to the notion that race is a variable, and 
therefore a fixed characteristic, Lewis (2003; 2004) further points out that race is a 
process and something people “do.” It can be understood as a process entailing 
consequences, both material and symbolic, determined by contextual specificity. Lewis 
(2003) clarifies:  
Race is about who we are, what we do, how we interact. It shapes where 
we live, whom we interact with, how we understand ourselves and others. 
But it does so in specific ways based on our social and historical location 
(p. 7). 
 
In micro-level exchanges, race is an identity that people impose and confer upon one 
another. As Lewis (2004) writes, “[Race] is something learned and achieved in 
interactions and institutions. It is something we live and perform” (p. 629). Therefore, 
group membership is too complex for race and group membership to be exhaustively 
operationalized as a variable with fixed characteristics. However, quantitative analyses all 
too often commit such errors (James 2008). Consequently, such studies oversimplify a 
fluidly complex concept and therefore negatively impacts what inferences can be made 
about a studied population. Unfortunately, this study is no different than many other 
quantitative studies in that it oversimplifies racial group membership. This is because I 
utilize the U.S. Census as a primary source of data. 
While limitations of internal validity are inherent within this study’s design, 
problems with external validity also apply. External validity refers to the researcher’s 
ability to draw inferences from sample data to represent the population of interest 
(Creswell 2009). Census data, unfortunately, are vulnerable to threats of external validity 
due to sample selection bias. Model (2009) clarifies: 
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The greatest source of inaccuracy in censuses is that individuals absent 
from the data differ in some systematic way from individuals present. The 
converse also occurs: censuses include persons who should be excluded, 
but that problem is less severe (p. 166). 
 
Some groups may be overrepresented among the data, and others may be 
underrepresented. At worst, census data reflects an untruthful reflection of the population.
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Illinois Lottery 
100 W. Randolph, Suite 7-274 
Chicago, IL 60601 
 
Re: Illinois Freedom of Information Request 
 
Dear FOIA Officer, 
 
This is a request for information under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, 5 ILCS 
140. I request that a copy of the following documents be provided to me: 
Annual Revenues Generated by Lottery Products per each Chicago Zip 
Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) by fiscal year, from 1999-2000 to 2001-
2002. 
  The ZCTAs of interest include: 
60614    60631 
60646    60655 
60656    60601 
60611    60613 
60630    60634 
60638    60657 
60619    60620 
60621    60624 
60628    60636 
60644    60649 
60653    60654 
60637    60643 
60651    60632 
 
I would like to obtain these records in either electronic format or physical document 
form. 
 
I understand that the Act permits a public body to charge a reasonable copying fee not to 
exceed the actual cost of reproduction and not including the costs of any search or review 
of the records, as stated in 5 ILCS 140(6). I request a waiver of all fees for this request. 
Disclosure of the requested information to me is in the public interest because it is likely 
to significantly contribute to public understanding of the operations regarding public 
education finance in Illinois.  
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I am interested in measuring lottery sales as tax-generated revenues, and I want to learn 
of where across Chicago these revenues originate. Such a request does not concern 
commercial interest. Rather, the inquired information will be utilized in the fulfillment of 
a master’s thesis project for the Department of Sociology at Loyola University Chicago.  
 
I look forward to hearing from you in writing within seven working days, as required by 
the Act–5 ILCS 140(3). 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Kasey Henricks 
Loyola University Chicago 
Department of Sociology 
1032 W. Sheridan Road 
Coffey Hall 434 
Chicago, IL 60660 
Tele: 423.364.9251 
Email: khenricks@luc.edu
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For best predictive results, assumptions of OLS regression analysis cannot be 
violated. Among these assumptions is “the multicollinearity problem.” This occurs when 
independent variables are highly correlated. When multicollienarity is present the overall 
reliability of the model remains intact, but coefficient estimates for each independent 
variable are susceptible to error (Lewis-Beck 1980). A consequence of multicollinearity 
is that standard errors for each independent variable will range broadly. 
Lewis-Beck (1980) offers two ways of testing whether multicollinearity exists 
within an OLS regression model. One commonly accepted method is two perform 
bivariate correlations between all pairs of independent variables within a model. If any 
correlation coefficient measures .8 or higher in absolute terms, then multicollinearity 
exists. While this method aptly detects correlations between variables, a major limitation 
of this diagnostic is that it is limited to examining only two variables at a time. This 
technique alone is inadequate for detecting multicollinearity within a multivariate 
regression model. To overcome this shortcoming, an additional test is recommended: 
“Regress each independent variable on all the other independent variables” (Lewis-Beck 
1980:60). When the explained variance (or R2) approaches 100 percent, multicollinearity 
is highly evident.  
After performing the first test, it becomes evident that multicollinearity may exist. 
(See Figure 11 for a summary of these results.) Using a correlation coefficient of .8 (in 
absolute terms) as the threshold measure, one pair of independent variables is suspect. 
This pair includes mean household income per ZCTA and education attainment level per 
ZCTA. Its coefficient measures .905. This correlate indicates that multicollinearity may 
exist within my models, but more conclusive evidence is needed for substantiation. 
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Figure 11. Multicollinearity Test One, Independent Variable Correlation Coefficients 
  Racial/Ethnic  Mean HH Income Pop. Percent w/          Total ZCTA  
  Composition  per ZCTA  BA, BS, or Higher       Pop. 18 and  
  per ZCTA     per ZCTA        Older 
Racial/Ethnic    
Composition  1  -.732   -.596   .218 
per ZCTA 
 
Mean HH Income 
per ZCTA  -.732  1   .905   -.206 
 
Pop. Percent w/  
BS, BA, or Higher -.596  .905   1   -.094 
per ZCTA 
 
Total ZCTA Pop., 
18 and Older  .218  -.206   -.094   1 
 
 To supplement the first test, and overcome some of its limitations, I have 
performed a second diagnostic. I have regressed each independent variable against all 
other independent variables. (See Figure 12 for a summary of these results.) If the R2 
value of a model approaches 1.0, then this serves as an indicator for the amount of 
multicollinearity that exists between a set of independent variables. After performing this 
diagnostic, it becomes apparent that two pairings are suspect. When the variables from 
Model 2 (which include racial/ethnic composition per ZCTA; population percent with 
BA, BS, or higher per ZCTA; and total ZCTA population, 18 and older) and Model Three 
(which include racial/ethnic composition per ZCTA; mean household income per ZCTA; 
and total ZCTA population, 18 and older) are regressed, their R2 values are .882 and .836, 
respectively. This indicates a significant level of multicollinearity exists.  
In a number of ways, results from the second multicollinearity test nuances the 
results from the first one. While mean household income per ZCTA and education 
attainment level per ZCTA are highly correlated, this relationship becomes more 
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complicated when other variables are introduced. Test Two confirms that a significant 
level of multicollinearity exists between all independent variables when both mean 
household income per ZCTA and education attainment level per ZCTA become 
dependent variables, but the degree of multicollinearity dwindles when race/ethnic 
composition per ZCTA becomes the outcome. This suggests that the relationship between 
income and education is muted in some instances when other mediating variables are 
considered. As the models in Test Two show, racial/ethnic composition (alongside other 
predictors) explains more variance of income and education, than do income and 
education (alongside other predictors) explain racial/ethnic composition.  
Figure 12. Multicollinearity Test Two, Regressions on Each Independent Variable 
       Outcome 
  Racial/Ethnic  Mean HH Income Pop. Percent w/          Total ZCTA 
  Composition  per ZCTA  BA, BS, or Higher      Pop. 18 and 
  per ZCTA     per ZCTA         Older 
Model Onea .561 
 
Model Twob    .882 
 
Model Threec       .836 
 
Model Fourd                    .092 
Note: Main entries are values of R2, which measures levels of explained variance.  
a Independent variables included in this model are as follows: Mean Household Income per ZCTA; Population Percent 
with BA, BS, or Higher per ZCTA; and Total ZCTA Population, 18 and Older.  
b Independent variables included in this model are as follows: Racial/Ethnic Composition per ZCTA; Population 
Percent with BA, BS, or Higher per ZCTA; and Total ZCTA Population, 18 and Older. 
c Independent variables included in this model are as follows: Racial/Ethnic Composition per ZCTA; Mean Household 
Income per ZCTA; and Total ZCTA Population, 18 and Older. 
d Independent variables included in this model are as follows: Racial/Ethnic Composition per ZCTA; Mean Household 
Income per ZCTA; and Population Percent with BA, BS, or Higher per ZCTA. 
Outcomes should not be interpreted in terms of a change in one particular 
independent variable when multicollinearity exists. This, however, does not mean 
independent variables have equal impacts in models where multicollinearity is present. In 
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my models, it becomes clear that racial/ethnic measures are more salient in predicting 
annual lottery revenues than class measures. Evidence for this is provided by comparing 
new regression models that omit each of the independent variables included in the full 
model (See Figure 13). In the third multicollinearity test, I present brief summaries of the 
original models compared to these new models.  Briefly let me discuss the results. 
Figure 13. Multicollinearity Test Three, Regression Models of Lottery Sales per ZCTA* 
Full Model    FY 1999  FY 2000  FY 2001  FY 2002 
Education   -195,350 -193,243 -184,213 -189,289 
Income    192  193  187  189 
Race/Ethnicity   2,228,913 2,329,109 2,317,587
 2,273,998 
Tax Base Population  194  184  179  189 
R2    .796  .788  .784  .762 
Model Without Race/Ethnicity 
Education   -142,052 -137,550 -128,794 -134,913 
Income    32  26  21  27 
Tax Base Population  202  193  188  198 
 R2    .607  .582  .571  .570 
Model Without Income 
 Education   -55,309  -52,400  -47,849  -50,851 
Race/Ethnicity   1,452,209 1,547,958 1,561,284
 1,506,185 
Tax Base Population  172  162  158  168 
R2    .717  .708  .706  .687 
Model Without Education 
 Income    -8  -4  -1  -4 
 Race/Ethncity   1,859,267 1,963,449 1,969,016
 1,915,820 
Tax Base Population   169  159  155  165 
R2    .681  .676  .677  .657 
 
N (ZCTAs)   25  25  25  25  
Note: Main entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (B). Below each these coefficients are values of R2, 
which measures levels of explained variance. 
Test Three shows that racial/ethnic composition per ZCTA impacts the outcome 
more than the other class variables. This is evident from each model’s level of explained 
variance. The R2 value is consistently highest when this variable is included in the model, 
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rather than excluded.  Inclusion of the racial/ethnic variable adds approximately 20 
percent more explained variance to the models, whereas inclusion of class variables only 
add approximate 10 percent more explained variance to the models.  
Another important finding to note in Table Three regards the unstandardized 
coefficients. Notice that in all the models the coefficients for the racial/ethnic measure are 
most reliable compared to the other variables’ coefficients. Its coefficient values 
consistently range between 1.5 and 2.3 million in every model. The education coefficient, 
on the other hand, erratically ranges in value from negative 200 thousand to negative 50 
thousand. In other words, its lowest coefficient value is approximately four times smaller 
than its highest coefficient value. Though the income coefficients also range broadly, 
they poses unique problems of their own. The income coefficients are consistently 
positive in value, except when education is excluded from the regression model. In this 
particular model, the income coefficient value changes from a positive to negative value. 
Such a change of sign is a common consequence when two variables in a regression 
model are highly correlated. All these statistics taken together lend support to the notion 
that racial/ethnic composition per ZCTA remains the most reliable and accurate measure 
included in the models. 
What does all this mean substantively? Exactly what I illustrate in Graphs Two 
through Five. When class measures are held constant, increases in racial minority 
representation translate into higher lottery sales. Communities of color contribute more to 
education via the lottery tax than do communities predominantly comprised by whites. 
Such an observation is consistent across all the regression models. Altogether, this lends 
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evidence that the lottery is racially regressive source of state income irrespective of class 
status. 
 66 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
Blalock, Garrick, David R. Just, and Daniel H. Simon. 2007. “Hitting the Jackpot or 
Hitting the Skids: Entertainment, Poverty, and the Demand for State Lotteries.” 
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 66(3):545-570. 
 
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2001. White Supremacy and Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era. 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. 
 
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo and Gianpaolo Baiocchi. 2008. “Anything But Racism: How 
Sociologists Limit the Significance of Racism.” Pp. 137- 151 in White Logic, 
White Methods: Racism and Methodology, edited by Zuberi, Tukufu and Eduardo 
Bonilla-Silva. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo, Carla Goar, and David G. Embrick. 2006. “When Whites Flock 
Together: The Social Psychology of White Habitus,” Critical Sociology, 32(2-
3):229-253. 
 
Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo and David G. Embrick. 2006. “Black, Honorary White, White: 
The Future of Race in the United States?” Pp. 33-48 in Mixed Messages: Doing 
Race in the Color-Blind Era, edited by David L. Brunsma. Boulder, Colorado: 
Lynne Rienner. 
 
Borg, Mary O. and Paul M. Mason. 1988. “The Budgetary Incidence of a Lottery to 
Support Education.” The National Tax Journal, 41(1):75-86. 
 
Borg, Mary O., Paul M. Mason, and Stephen L. Shapiro. 1991. The Economic 
Consequences of State Lotteries. New York, New York: Praeger Publishers. 
 
Brown, Wendy. 2003. “Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy.” Theory and 
Event, 7(1):1-43. 
 
“Center for Tax and Budget Accountability.” 2008. Money Matter: How the Illinois 
School Funding System Creates Significant Educational Inequities that Impact 
Most Students in the State. Retrieved May 14, 2011. (http://www.ctbaonline.org/ 
All%20Links%20to%20Research%20Areas%20and%20Reports/Education/2008
%20Education%20Report%2010-31-08%20EDITED %20 FINAL.pdf). 
 
“Chicago Tribune.” 2011. “Real Estate: Communities - Chicago Communities.” Chicago 
Tribune. Retrieved August 9, 2011. ( http://www.chicagotribune.com/classified/ 
realestate/communities/chi-communities,0,7944296.htmlstory 
 
67 
 
“Chicago Urban League.” 2008. “Chicago Urban League Files Civil Rights Lawsuit on 
School Funding: Lawsuit Calls for an End to Discriminatory Practices that have 
Left African American and Latino Children Behind.” Chicago Urban League. 
Retreived May 14, 2011. (http://www.thechicagourbanleague.org/ 
chicagourbanleague/lib/chicagourbanleague/School%20Funding%20Lawsuit%20
Press%20Release.pdf). 
 
Clotfelter, Charles T. and Phillip J. Cook. 1989. Selling Hope: State Lotteries in America. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
 
Cook, Philip J. and Charles T. Clotfelter. 1993. “The Peculiar Scale Economics of Lotto.” 
American Economic Review, 83(3):634-643. 
 
Combs, Kathryn L., Jaebeom Kim, and John A. Spry. 2008. “The Relative Regressivity 
of Seven Lottery Games.” Applied Economics, 40(1):35-39. 
 
Creswell, John W. 2009. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches (3rd Edition). Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE. 
 
Cronin, Barry. 1986. “‘Insulting’ Lottery Sign on W. Side Sets Off Boycott.” Chicago 
Sun-Times, February 6: 37. 
 
Czaja, Ronald and Johnny Blair. 2005. Designing Surveys: A Guide to Decisions and 
Procedures. Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press. 
 
Eisenstein, Hester. 2009. Feminism Seduced: How Global Elites Use Women’s Labor and 
Ideas to Exploit the World. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm. 
 
Feagin, Joe R. 2006. Systemic Racism: A Theory of Oppression. New York: Routledge. 
 
Feagin, Joe R. 2000. Racist America: Roots, Current Realities, and Future Reparations. 
New York: Routledge. 
 
Gallagher, Charles A. 2004. “Racial Redistricting: Expanding the Boundaries of 
Whiteness.” Pp. 59-76 in The Politics of Multiracialism: Challenging Racial 
Thinking, edited by Heather M. Dalmadge. Albany, New York: State University 
of New York Press. 
 
Garvía, Roberto. 2007. “Syndication, Institutionalization, and Lottery Play.” American 
Journal of Sociology, 113(3):603-652. 
 
Gilens, Martin. 1999. Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of 
Anti-Poverty Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
68 
 
Gillespie, Mark. 1999. “Lotteries Most Popular Form of Gambling for Americans: 
Casinos, Office Pools Also Popular; Internet Gambling Still a Long Shot …” 
Gallup, Inc., June 17, 1999. Retrieved November 21, 2009. (http://www.gallup. 
com/poll/3769/Lotteries-Most-Popular-Form-Gambling-Americans.aspx). 
 
Golash-Boza, Tanya and Douglas A. Parker. 2008. “Immigrant Rights as Human Rights.” 
Pp. 107-126 in Globalization and America: Race, Human Rights, and Inequality, 
edited by Angela J. Hattery, David G. Embrick, and Earl Smith. Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowan and Littlefield. 
 
Goodman, Robert. 1995. The Luck Business: The Devastating Consequences and Broken 
Promises of America’s Gambling Explosion. New York: Free Press. 
 
Guryan, Jonathon and Melissa S. Kearney. 2009. “Is Lottery Gambling Addictive?” 
Unpublished Paper. Retrieved October 2, 2009. (http://faculty.chicagobooth. 
edu/jonathan.guryan/ research/guryan-kearney-addiction-Jan2009.pdf). 
 
Hansen, Ann. 1995. “The Tax Incidence of the Colorado State Instant Lottery Game.” 
Public Finance Quarterly, 23(3):385-398. 
 
Illinois Lottery. 2010. A Charmed Life. Illinois Lottery Annual Report 2009. Retrieved 
June 11, 2011. (http://www.illinoislottery.com/subsections/PR/FY09AnRpt.pdf). 
 
Illinois Lottery. 2009. Dream By Numbers: Illinois Lottery Annual Report 2008. 
Retrieved September 5, 2009. (http://www.illinoislottery.com/subsections/PR/ 
FY08AnRpt.pdf). 
 
Illinois Lottery. 2005. Winning Big: Illinois Lottery Annual Report 2005. Retrieved June 
3, 2010. (http://www. illinoislottery.com/subsections/PR/FY05AnRpt.pdf). 
 
Illinois State Board of Education. 2011. General State Aid – FY 2011 Overview. 
Retrieved May 14, 2011. (http://www.isbe.state.il.us/funding/pdf/ 
gsa_overview.pdf). 
 
Illinois State Comptroller. N.d. “The General State Aid Formula.” Fiscal Focus 
Magazine: A Publication of the Illinois State Comptroller. Retrieved May 10, 
2011. (http://www.ioc. state.il.us/FiscalFocus/article.cfm?ID=204). 
 
James, Angela. 2008. “Making Sense of Race and Racial Classification.” Pp. 31-45 in 
White Logic, White Methods: Racism and Methodology, edited by Zuberi, Tukufu 
and Eduardo Bonilla-Silva. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield. 
 
Johnson, Donald R. 1999. “Public School Finance Programs of the United States and 
Canada 1998-1999.” U.S. Department of Education: National Center for 
69 
 
Education Statistics. Retrieved November 30, 2009. (http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/ 
pdf/StFinance/Illinois.pdf). 
 
Jones, Jeffery M. 2009. “One in Six Americans Gamble on Sports: State Lotteries are 
most common form of gambling.” Gallup, Inc., February 1, 2008. Retrieved 
October 4, 2009. (http://www.gallup.com/poll/104086/One-Six-Americans-
Gamble-Sports.aspx). 
 
Jones-Correa, Michael. 2006. “Reshaping the American Dream: Immigrants and the 
Politics of the New Suburbs.” Pp. 183-204 in The New Suburban History, edited 
by Kevin M. Kruse and Thomas J. Sugrue. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Kealy, Douglas. 1987. “Aids, Education and the Year 2000!” Woman’s Own, October 
31:8-10. 
 
Koziol, Ronald and Dave Schneidman. 1986. “Lottery not so well off in Du Page.” 
Chicago Tribune, July 24:1. 
 
Krysan, Maria and Michael D. M. Bader. 2009. “Racial Blind Spots: Black-White-Latino 
Differences in Community Knowledge.” Social Problems, 56(4):677-701. 
 
Lewis, Amanda E. 2003. Race in the Schoolyard: Negotiating the Color Line in 
Classrooms and Communities. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University 
Press. 
 
Lewis, Amanda E. 2004. “What Group?: Studying Whites and Whiteness in the Era of 
‘Color-Blindness.’” Sociological Theory, 22(4):623-646. 
 
Lewis Mumford Center. 2001. Ethnic Diversity Grows, Neighborhood Integration Lags 
Behind. Albany, New York: Lewis Mumford Center. 
 
Lewis-Beck, Michael S. 1980. Applied Regression: An Introduction. Beverly Hills, 
California: SAGE Publications.  
 
Lipsitz, George. 1998. The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit 
from Identity Politics. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press. 
 
Logan, John R. 2004. “How Race Counts for Hispanic Americans.” Sage Race Relations 
Abstracts, 29(2):7-19. 
 
Ludwig, Jack. 1999. “Charge That Gambling Industry Preys on the Poor Not Borne Out 
in Gallup Survey: High-Income and High-Education Americans Plays Heavily.” 
Gallup, Inc., July 8, 1999. Retrieved November 18, 2009. (http://www.gallup. 
com/ poll/3733/ Charge-Gambling-Industry-Preys-Poor-Borne-Gallup-
Survey.aspx). 
70 
 
 
Madigan, Lisa. 2004. A Guide to the Illinois Freedom of Information Act. Retrieved 
November 10, 2009. (http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/government/ 
FOIA_guide.pdf). 
 
Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy A. Denton. 1993. American Apartheid: Segregation and 
the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University. 
 
McCrary, Joseph L. and Thomas J. Palvak. 2002. Who Plays the Georgia Lottery?: 
Results of a Statewide Survey. Athens, Georgia: Carl Vinson Institute of 
Government, University of Georgia. 
 
McKoy, Deborah L. and Jeffrey M. Vincent. 2006. “Housing and Education: The 
Inextricable Link.” Pp. 125-150 in Segregation: The Rising Costs for America, 
edited by James H. Carr and Nandinee K. Kutty. New York: Routledge. 
 
Michael, Joseph and Jeffrey M. Timberlake. 2008. “Are Latinos Becoming White? 
Determinants of Latinos’ Racial Self-Identification in the United States.” Pp.107-
119 in Racism in Post-Race America: New Theories, New Directions, edited by 
Charles A. Gallagher. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Social Forces. 
 
Mikesell, John L. 1989. “A Note on the Changing Incidence of State Lottery Finance.” 
Social Science Quarterly, 70(2):513-521. 
 
Model, Suzanne. 2008. West Indian Immigrants: A Black Success Story? New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Neubeck, Kenneth J. and Noel A. Cazenave. 2001. Welfare Racism: Playing the Race 
Card Against People’s Poor. New York: Routledge. 
 
Nibert, David. 2000. Hitting the Lottery Jackpot: Government and the Taxing of Dreams. 
New York, New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Norušis, Marija J. 2008. SPSS Statistics 17.0 Guide to Data Analysis. Upper Saddle 
River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
 
Oliver, Melvin L. & Thomas M. Shapiro. [1995] 2006. Black Wealth/ White Wealth: A 
New Perspective on Racial Inequality (2nd Edition). New York: Routledge. 
 
Orfield, Gary and Chungmei Lee. 2005. Why Education Matters: Poverty and 
Educational Inequality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Civil Rights Project, 
Harvard University. 
 
Omi, Michael and Howard Winant. [1986] 1994. Racial Formation in the United States: 
From the 1960s to the 1990s (2nd Edition). New York: Routledge. 
71 
 
 
Perez, Anthony Daniel. 2008. “Who is Hispanic? Shades of Ethnicity among Latino/a 
Youth.” Pp.17-33 in Racism in Post-Race America: New Theories, New 
Directions, edited by Charles A. Gallagher. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Social 
Forces. 
 
Price, Donald I. and E. Shawn Novak. 1999. “The Tax Incidence of Three Texas Lottery 
Games: Regressivity, Race, and Education.” National Tax Journal, LII(4):741-
751. 
 
Ritzer, George. [1993] 2011. The McDonaldization of Society (Sixth Edition). Thousand 
Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press. 
 
Sassen, Saskia. 1990. “Economic Restructuring and the American City.” Annual Review 
of Sociology, 16:465-490. 
 
Smith, Dorothy E. 2007. “Making Change From Below.” Socialist Studies, 3(2):7-30. 
 
Sohoni, Deenesh and Salvatore Saporito. 2009. “Mapping School Segregation: Using 
GIS to Explore Racial Segregatoin between Schools and Their Corresponding 
Attendance Areas.” Journal of Education, 115(August):569-600. 
 
State of Illinois. 2009. Illinois State Budget: Fiscal Year 2010. Retrieved September 4, 
2009. (http://www.state.il.us/budget/FY2010/FY2010_Operating_Budget.pdf). 
 
Stranahan, Harriet A. and Mary O. Borg. 1998. “Separating the Decision of Lottery 
Expenditures and Participation: A Truncated Tobit Approach.” Public Finance 
Review, 26(2):99-117. 
 
Thornton, Mark. 1999. “The Lottery Tax.” Ludwig von Mises Institute: Mises Daily, June 
28. Retrieved June 9, 2010. (http://mises.org/daily/249). 
 
U.S. Census Bureau. 2001a. Census 2000 Summary File 1 Illinois. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
U.S. Census Bureau. 2001b. Census 2000 Summary File 3 Illinois. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
Wilson, William Julius. 1978. The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing 
American Institutions. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press.   
 
Wilson, William Julius. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, 
and Public Policy. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. 
 
72 
 
Yancey, George A. 2003. Who is White? Latinos, Asians, and the New Black/NonBlack 
Divide. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. 
 73 
 
VITA 
Kasey Henricks is a white man, born of slave-owning ancestry in Chattanooga, 
Tennessee. He is a high school dropout who began his collegiate career at Chattanooga 
State Technical Community College. After graduating with an associate’s degree in 2004, 
he transferred to Austin Peay State University where he studied sociology and 
engineering. In 2008, he obtained a bachelor’s degree, cum laude. He is a first generation 
college graduate, but is not content with ending his formal education until he has earned a 
doctorate of philosophy. His research interests are to critically study race and its 
continuing significance. 
While at APSU, Kasey was regionally recognized on four occasions: three times 
as a journalist and once as a sociologist. He was a two-time SouthEast Journalism 
Conference award-winning columnist for the 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 academic years, 
and he was also an editorial board member of the “Third Best College Newspaper in the 
South” for the 2006-2007 academic year. As a sociologist, Kasey was recognized for his 
undergraduate thesis, which placed second in the student paper competition at the 2009 
SouthEastern Undergraduate Sociological Symposium. 
Since arriving at Loyola University Chicago in 2009, Kasey has continued some 
of these same successes. For the 2010-2011 academic year, he was awarded the Global 
and Community Stewards Fellowship by The Graduate School at Loyola University 
Chicago to fund his work on the lottery and education finance. More recently, he was
74 
 
elected the Student Representative of the American Sociological Association’s Section on 
Race and Ethnic Minorities during the 2011-2012 academic year. His work has been 
published in a number of academic outlets such as Social Thought and Research, 
Sociological Insight, and Racism Review.  
Currently, Kasey is a Ph.D. Student of Sociology at Loyola University Chicago 
and is expected to graduate in 2015. After graduation, he plans to become a professor 
where he can continue his research and teaching interests. He lives in Chicago, Illinois. 
